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Abstract
A recent editorial by Naoki Ikegami has proposed three key lessons from Japan’s experience of achieving virtually 
universal coverage with primary healthcare services: the need to integrate the existing providers of primary healthcare 
services into the organised health system; the need to limit government commitments to finance hospital services and 
the need to empower providers of primary healthcare to influence decisions that influence their livelihoods. Although 
the context of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) differs in many ways from Japan in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, the lesson that short-term initiatives to achieve universal coverage need to be complemented by an 
understanding of the factors influencing long-term change management remains highly relevant.
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A recent editorial by Naoki Ikegami draws on Japan’s historical experience to provide advice to countries wishing to move towards universal health 
coverage.1 Ikegami argues that the Japanese Government 
made three strategic decisions during the early stages of 
modernising their country’s health system, which facilitated 
the development of primary healthcare services: it provided 
opportunities for established practitioners to integrate in 
the organised healthcare system during a gradual transition 
to Western medicine; it limited the supply of hospitals and 
gave them little public funding and it involved the Japan 
Medical Association, which was dominated by clinic-based 
physicians, in establishing a fee schedule that favoured 
primary healthcare. Ikegami suggests that these measures 
gave providers of primary healthcare services influence over 
the pattern of health sector development. He acknowledges 
that the current situation in many low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) differs substantially from late 19th and 
early 20th century Japan. Nonetheless, he argues, three 
general lessons emerge from this experience. 
1. Integrate Existing Providers of Primary Healthcare Services 
Into the Organised Health System
This is especially important in countries with pluralistic 
health systems, where people seek advice and obtain drugs 
from a wide variety of providers in terms of their training, 
professional standing and relationship to the regulatory 
system.2,3 In Bangladesh and India, for example, the poor make 
heavy use of providers of medical advice and drugs, working 
largely outside the regulatory framework.4-6 Until recently 
the governments of these countries ignored these providers. 
They allocated all public funding for primary health services 
to government clinics, failed to collect routine information on 
the informal providers and resisted any measures that could 
be construed as giving them “legitimacy.” The organised 
medical profession lobbied for this approach on the grounds 
of preventing a “lowering of standards.” Despite this neglect, 
the informal providers have continued to be the first port of 
call for routine health problems and recent studies have found 
very little difference between informal providers and private 
medical practitioners in their treatment of routine health 
problems.7 A recent report suggests that falls in mortality from 
post-natal sepsis and childhood pneumonia in Bangladesh 
can be largely attributed to the almost universal access to 
inexpensive antibiotics from informal providers.8 One sign 
of a changing approach by governments to this issue is the 
recent announcement by the Indian State of West Bengal of 
a programme of training for its rural medical practitioners. 
This could be a first step towards the involvement of these 
providers in government strategies for increasing access 
to primary healthcare services and towards improving the 
quality of services they provide.
The experience of China may point a way forward. During 
the period of collective agriculture in the 1960s and 1970, it 
trained many “barefoot doctors” to lead preventive campaigns 
and provide basic medical care to rural residents. During 
the transition to a market economy, these cadres evolved 
into “village doctors,” who continued to undertake some 
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public health work, but made a living by selling drugs.9 
The government subsequently required village doctors to 
pass regular examinations and register with the local health 
bureau. Since 2009 the government has required all local 
governments to allocate an agreed amount of money per 
capita to primary healthcare services.10 The village doctors 
are expected to play a role in the provision of these services 
and are paid for doing so. In many localities their work is 
supervised by local government health facilities and they 
are gradually being integrated into the primary healthcare 
system. However, they are not government employees and 
there is evidence of competition for resources between village 
doctors and employees of township health centres.
2. Limit Government Commitment to Finance Hospital 
Services 
Ikegami acknowledges that it is much more difficult for 
governments to limit their financial commitment to hospital 
services than it was during the first half of the 20th century. 
Hospitals now have a much greater capacity to provide 
effective treatment for many serious diseases. The ageing of 
the population and the rapidly rising burden of illness from 
chronic non-communicable diseases has increased demand 
for hospital care. Also, the long history of unequal access 
to hospital care has generated political pressure to expand 
access to people who have been previously excluded. The 
experiences of South Africa and China illustrate the problem. 
In both countries, a privileged population group has long had 
access to high quality hospital services. In apartheid South 
Africa, the “Whites” had comprehensive health insurance 
that entitled them to hospital care and the hospitals gradually 
increased their capacity to provide modern diagnosis and 
treatment. In China, the employees of urban enterprises 
had a similar kind of coverage. During the period of rapid 
economic growth in the transition to a market economy, 
these hospitals invested substantially to provide the most 
up-to-date medical care. In both cases, this created a “gold 
standard” of sophisticated, hospital-based care to which 
the rest of the population aspired. Both countries have 
experienced a lot of pressure to extend the right to a similar 
standard of hospital care much more widely. Other hospitals 
have lobbied for improvements in their facilities, equipment 
and staffing and other population groups have sought access 
to what they perceive to be “quality care,” paying high hospital 
bills in many cases. The costs to individual families are often 
financially crippling. This has generated political pressure to 
protect people against “catastrophic health expenditure.”11 
The ability of hospitals to attract the most highly trained and 
experienced health workers has contributed to a vicious circle 
in which patients bypass what they perceive to be inadequate 
primary level facilities and put additional pressure on hospital 
services. The resultant overcrowding leads to pressure to 
expand hospital services and neglect primary healthcare. In 
both countries, the governments face enormous challenges in 
convincing the population to seek less expensive and more 
appropriate primary-level services.
Governments need to find ways to protect people against 
catastrophic health expenditure, whilst limiting the risk of 
escalating hospital costs and ensuring that the population 
has realistic expectations of the kinds of services to which 
the government can ensure access. Many countries are 
contemplating the introduction of hospital insurance schemes 
in response to the financial hardship faced by families 
of hospitalised patients and the pressure by hospitals for 
additional funding. The lessons from Japan, South Africa, and 
China underline the need to avoid the kind of vicious circle 
described above. One measure that governments can take is 
to ensure that people have access to an effective and well-
respected primary healthcare service, before guaranteeing to 
provide highly subsidised hospital care. They can also invest 
in improving the management of hospitals to ensure that they 
provide effective and also cost-effective services. They also 
need to build the capacity of government and/or insurance 
schemes to monitor and prevent unnecessarily rapid rises in 
hospital costs. 
3. Empower Providers of Primary Healthcare Services to 
Ensure That Their Livelihoods Reflect Their Importance to 
Health and Health Services
The experiences of many countries suggest that the 
perspectives of hospital managers and hospital-based medical 
specialists tend to have undue influence on the allocation of 
public resources in the absence of specific measures to give 
voice to primary healthcare stakeholders. 
In Japan, the involvement of an association of providers of 
clinic services in the setting of fees ensured that their interests 
were taken into account. Elsewhere, and in the 21st century, 
representatives of primary healthcare providers may be 
quite different. They might include primary care doctors, 
nurse practitioners, pharmacists, “informal providers” and 
community health workers. They might also include non-
government organisations, faith-based organisations, and 
private providers of clinic services. A coalition for primary 
healthcare could also include representatives of users of 
services, such as organisations based on place of residence, 
ethnicity or way of making a living. In Brazil, for example, 
locality-based community groups have been actively involved 
in local health planning.12 The challenge for governments is to 
create mechanisms to enable these stakeholders to participate 
in decision-making and influence public opinion.
Conclusion
The situation in many LMICs is more complex than in Japan 
during the first half of the 20th century. Medical knowledge and 
healthcare technology has advanced a lot and the expectations 
of people for effective care has risen. Developments in the 
media and information technology mean that people can 
compare their entitlements to those in other countries. 
Lobbying by health workers, providers of services and 
suppliers of pharmaceuticals has become sophisticated and 
intense. Despite these many changes, Ikegami’s emphasis on 
stakeholder interests and the long-term and path-dependent 
nature of change remains relevant. The lesson from Japan is 
that short-term initiatives to achieve universal coverage need 
to be complemented by longer-term management of health 
system change, which could involve building a coalition for 
primary healthcare; managing expectations of entitlements to 
health services and controlling unnecessarily large increases 
in public spending on hospital services. This is an important 
message to health sector leaders and the research community 
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which provides evidence to support the management of 
change.
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